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ALİ L. KARAOSMANOĞLU
Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Bilkent University;
Director, İhsan Doğramacı Foundation Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
ABSTRACT In Turkey, civil-military relations are often understood and explained from a
binary and confrontational perspective. Although this conceptual framework is not comple-
tely irrelevant, it is far from being adequate to explain the close collaboration that has
characterized civil-military relations since 2007. The principal reason for this gap in the lit-
erature is that the mainstream approach overemphasizes the power political aspect of civil-
military relations while it overlooks their historical-cultural and international-structural
dimensions.
Civil-military relations in Turkey have recently taken a turn towards further democra-
tization. This development is different from the previous reforms which were adopted
by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government from 2002 to 2006 for the
purpose of harmonization with the European Union (EU). This time the change is
unfolding to some extent independently of Ankara’s European vocation. The new
pattern is characterized by close and effective collaboration between the civilian
government and the military.
Although the EU reforms had brought Turkey more in line with democratic
norms and practices, public declarations of political significance by military
leaders in 2006 and 2007 demonstrated the continuing influence of the Armed
Forces on public affairs. On April 27, 2007, the Chief of General Staff General
Yaşar Büyükanıt’s encroachment on the presidential election through an “electronic
ultimatum” was a blatant example of the continuing political role of the Turkish
Armed Forces (TAF). That ultimatum of General Staff, however, was promptly
and strongly refuted by the government.1 The landslide victory of the AKP in the
general election of July 2007 consolidated the legitimacy of the government even
further.
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These developments led to a perplexing turn in civil-military relations. Many
people in the country and abroad were expecting the confrontation to result in a
coup d’état or, at least, in a heavy military encroachment upon politics. Remarkably,
none of these happened. Instead, there was an emergence of a new pattern which was
marked by common understanding and an implicit but effective collaboration
between the civilian government and the military. According to many people, a
Prime Minister with Islamic roots and the laicist generals was unlikely to
meet almost every week in addition to their official routine meetings. What was
believed to be clear turned out to be anything but clear. This unexpected propinquity
between Prime Minister and High Command posed a disturbing puzzle: what might
account for this new pattern?
The mainstream approach to civil-military relations in Turkey is generally based on
power relations. That approach often starts from a dichotomy between the secular,
patriotic, rational and modern soldier versus the elected, but inefficient and anti-
secularist politician.2 This assumption has often been used to rationalize military
takeovers and other lesser military interventions in politics.
Some academics and columnists believe in the necessity of military guardianship
because, according to them, the population is not yet educated and mature enough to
elect the “right” politicians. They also argue that the military’s interference with
politics should continue and should be accepted as an indispensable part of the con-
stitutional regime in a country like Turkey.3 Those analysts who are critical of the
military’s influence on politics also predicate their arguments on a similar binary
assumption by underlining conflict-ridden aspects of the relationship between the
military and the civilian elite. They regard civil-military matters mainly as
“power relations that involve constant confrontation and tension.”4 Therefore,
“civil-military relations are power relations because they refer to a conflict about
who will have the upper hand when it comes to contentious issues.”5 It is further
argued that civilian politicians give their consent for the demands of the military
and “even seek an enhanced role for the military.”6 The problem, therefore, accord-
ing to that approach “is not just the implementation of the democratic control of the
armed forces, but the larger one of civilian empowerment, that is, enabling civilian
governments to take control over not only the military universe but also the life of
the country, the economy, political process, institutional make-up, [and the like].”7
It is assumed that the military by its very nature tend to dominate all of the above.
Some scholars have pushed this kind of analysis to the extreme by asserting that the
TAF’s propensity “to make and break governments does not seem at all a passing
phenomenon.”8 The main instrument of the military in maintaining and expanding
its influence over politics has been its undue attribution of primacy to the internal
security issues such as “Islamic activism and Kurdish nationalism” over the external
threats.9
Such arguments, however, have not been readily acceptable to some scholars and
analysts. As early as 2005 a Report by the Centre for European Security Studies
(CESS) criticized the general European perceptions of the Turkish military’s political
role as exaggerated and simplistic. The Report criticized the view that the TAF was “a






























state within a state for all practical purposes.” The Report stated that it was “a cari-
cature of present-day Turkey, not only unflattering but . . . inaccurate.”10
In a recent Adelphi Paper, Karabekir Akkoyunlu points out:
It would be misleading to look at Turkish democratization from a binary per-
spective, juxtaposing an authoritarian military against democratically inclined
civilian politicians. Turkish democratization is best studied through a holistic
approach that analyses the evolution of democratic political culture in
Turkey.11
Although the binary analyses have long been reflective of certain aspects of the
Turkish case, their explanatory value is increasingly fading away as a result of the
above-mentioned trends which require a new paradigm for their clearer comprehen-
sion and explanation. The binary and power-based approaches, however scholarly,
overlook the highly interactive and transformative character of civil-military
relations. They minimize the possibility of collaboration and institutional-functional
interpenetration in a fairly large setting of shared understandings that derive from
Turkey’s historical and political context.12 The civil authority needs the armed
forces for the defense of the state and the country’s territorial integrity. In return,
the armed forces need the civil authority for the recognition of their own legitimacy
in accordance with fundamental democratic principles.13 The main issue then is not a
simple maximization of civilian power over the armed forces. The real problem is
“how to maintain a strong and effective military that poses no threat to the civilian
elite.”14 This problem can be effectively managed by bringing about an appropriate
collegial relationship between the military and civilian elites.15 After all, an effective
control of the military depends on the cooperation of the officer corps with the civi-
lian government and vice versa. Both function within the same state structure and
need each other.
Moreover, given the organizational and functional specificities of the military insti-
tution and the fusion of internal and external security in the contemporary world, no
civilian authority can afford to overlook the growing significance of the military input
in political decision making. This question has recently come to the forefront particu-
larly in Great Britain and the United States because of the war on terror and invasion
of Iraq. General Sir Richard Dannett’s criticism of his government’s decision to
invade Iraq was probably an unprecedented act of insubordination for a serving
head of the army in a highly liberal democratic country such as the United
Kingdom. This incident, however, marked the need for a new type of civil-military
relations. Sir Richard’s complaints also echoed the restiveness of the military in
the US.16 In the same year, Hew Strachan published a piece in Survival, criticizing
approaches that regard armed forces simply as an instrument of the civilian govern-
ment without due consideration of the nature and capabilities of that instrument.
Strachan stressed the significance of the “dialogue between politicians and soldiers
and . . . the harmonization of the two elements.”17 Strachan further suggested: “The
principle we need to embrace is that of civil-military integration, founded on the






























notions of equality in council and of harmonization of effects.”18 Such a revised
system of civil-military relations, according to Strachan, will reintegrate the armed
forces and the government within the state structure and render the parliamentary
control on both the civilian and military agents of the executive more effective.
Thus, it will help improve the smooth functioning of the democratic regime,
because the last word will still belong to civilian government.19
In the contemporary world, the political and military spheres are interpenetrating
more than ever. Civil-military relations should not be considered as a conflict-
ridden relationship. Political and military leaders are expected to collaborate in reach-
ing a constructive consensus not only on defense and security policies, but also on
how to manage their relationship within the state and society. These views that are
nowadays being debated in liberal democracies such as the United States and
Great Britain are equally relevant for a country such as Turkey, which is working
to consolidate its democracy in a highly challenging security environment.
International-Structural Dimension
The mainstream approach to the Turkish case focuses on internal political factors and
ignores the broader security environment and international factors. On the one hand,
the rising ethnic separatism combined with regional security challenges involving
extra-regional forces such as the invasion of Iraq by the US and, on the other
hand, the rising democratic and liberal values as a result of globalization have
blurred the demarcation line between the internal and the international. This develop-
ment has brought about the international dimension alongside the internal dimension
of security challenges and made the military and civilian outlooks externally as well
as politically oriented. Moreover, we are witnessing today an “aggregation of differ-
ent conflicts”20 in the Middle East. This is the result of a structural systemic develop-
ment instead of a securitization discourse, blaming external actors for internal
security problems. The convergence of different security challenges emanating
both from inside and outside has brought the political and other non-military
aspects of conflict to the forefront.
Michael Desch studied the impact of international and internal security environ-
ments on civil-military relations in the US, the Soviet Union and the Latin American
countries. According to his findings, “in challenging external security environment
civilian and military ideas will converge”21 and this will facilitate the civilian
control of the military. Conversely, “challenging domestic threat environments
would produce internally-oriented military doctrines which inevitably lead to
serious weaknesses in civilian control of the military.”22 The interaction of internal
and external structural factors and the degree of their influence will shape the patterns
of civilian control of the military.23 In such situations, we should look at variables
such as the military doctrine,24 historical experiences, security culture, and the mili-
tary mindset.
The Kurdish separatism and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), accepted as a
terrorist organization by the international community, represented not only a






























domestic threat, but also posed an international threat with growing regional and extra
regional involvements. The ultimate aim of the PKK has always been political. In the
1970s, it was created as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization whose aim was
to set up a “democratic and united Kurdistan” in southeastern Turkey.25 During the
first decades of the PKK’s development, the politicians and the military had difficulty
to correctly diagnose the nature and capacities of that organization. The officials had
the habit of calling it as a “handful of bandits” (bir avuç eşkiya).26 This lack of under-
standing led the governments to completely transfer the responsibility of dealing with
the PKK to the TAF, detaching the conflict from its political context.
In the meantime, the PKK became a typical transnational terrorist organization
with many connections, support bases, and propaganda centers in the Middle East
and Europe.27 In the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the demise of the Iraqi govern-
ment north of the thirty-sixth parallel complicated Turkey’s security considerations.
The region became a sanctuary for the PKK terrorists, who began to operate from
northern Iraq. Between the two Gulf Wars, the TAF operated in the Iraqi territory
nearly seventy times to hit the PKK camps and disrupt their logistic lines. All
these operations remained within the purview of the military and were called “internal
security operations.” without any strategic link between them and politics and
between internal and international.
Another aspect of the changing political context is that Turkey is passing through a
radical transformation. It initiated an extensive program of liberalization and restruc-
turing reforms in law, politics and economy. These measures are motivated by a
desire for further democratization. The reforms include inter alia measures broaden-
ing cultural rights and freedoms of expression and association. The extraordinary
security measures which had been adopted in the southeastern regions of the
country were lifted. The military consented to those reforms. Prime Minister at the
time, Abdullah Gül extended his gratitude to the military for their collaboration
and support: “The TAF made valuable contributions to our EU objectives and
reforms. They would have been much more difficult to carry out without the
support of the military. The TAF well appreciate what Turkey’s interests are. They
have a long-term strategic vision.”28 The liberalization of politics as a result of
reforms encouraged debate on the Kurdish question and the struggle against the
PKK by bringing the political aspects of these issues to the forefront.
Another development affecting civil-military relations took place after the second
Gulf War. In 2007 and 2008, the air and land forces undertook fifteen cross-border
operations against PKK targets in northern Iraq. Before the launching of the oper-
ations, the government worked hard to prepare a favorable political and diplomatic
environment in the US, Europe, and the Middle East. Since then Prime Minister
Erdoğan and the Chief of General Staff have been getting together almost weekly
in official and unofficial settings to discuss and evaluate operations and other security
problems. One of the summit declarations in early June 2007 emphasized that the
fight against terrorism would be carried out “on the basis of democracy and rule of
law.”29 It also said that there was “full harmony and coordination” between the gov-
ernment and the armed forces.30 This collegial relationship between the civil






























government and the military created not only a window of opportunity for further
democratization, but it also underlined the significance of the strategic interaction
between politics and military operations. Furthermore, it brought to the forefront
the inescapable political dimension of counter-terrorism and the Kurdish problem.
Two factors motivated civil-military collaboration; before and during the operations,
the need to maintain national solidarity became an issue of high priority. The military
wanted to avoid any steps that would split the nation between the Kurds and Turks.
Two days before the general elections of July 2007, Foreign Minister at the time,
Abdullah Gül made a declaration saying that there was no rift between the TAF
and the government and the damage caused by the “electronic ultimatum” of the
General Staff was already “repaired.”31 Secondly, and probably more significantly,
a change of approach to the struggle against the PKK has occurred. The relative inter-
nationalization of the PKK issue and the Kurdish problem on the one hand, and their
convergence with the complex warfare in Iraq, on the other hand, aggregated diverse
security challenges emanating both from inside and outside. This development has
made the political and other non-military dimensions increasingly visible. Moreover,
the revival of the PKK despite successful military operations in the 1990s recon-
firmed the need to subordinate military operations to a new comprehensive under-
standing by integrating military and political efforts for economic, diplomatic,
social-psychological, and public relations measures.32 Such an approach would natu-
rally require a close collaboration between the military and the civilian government.
Notwithstanding the ongoing civil-military cooperation, as of Spring 2011, there are
no signs that the government has yet formulated a comprehensive policy on the
Kurdish question.
Historical-Cultural Dimension
The conflict-oriented approach tends to detach itself from the historical and cultural
context, too. It reduces the complexities of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization to a
simplistic dichotomy. Civil-military relations in every country, however, occur and
develop “under the guidance of cultural patterns,” which are “historically created
systems of meaning in terms of which we give form, order, point, and direction to
our lives.”33 In civil-military research and security studies, cultural approach is
becoming increasingly important.34
According to Colin Gray, security culture “change over time, as new experience is
absorbed, coded and culturally translated.”35 Culture is not insular. Cultures interpe-
netrate and take new forms, albeit slowly. The question, therefore, is not whether a
particular national security culture is changeable or not. The question is about the
direction, quality, and degree of change. Culture changes through inter-subjective
processes within communities and between communities.
Turkey has a deep-rooted security culture which has been shaped by the accumu-
lation of historical experiences and interpenetration of diverse kinds of discourses
both under the Ottoman Empire and the Republic.36 Turkey’s responses to security
challenges from within and without, and thus civil-military relations, are profoundly






























affected by its security culture as much as by material structural factors such as power
configurations in the international system. Turkey’s security culture has paradoxical
characteristics. While some of these characteristics are facilitating the democratiza-
tion of civil-military relations, the others are complicating democratic processes.
Civil-military relations in Turkey cannot be defined as a linear development of
cultural change. It has been (and is being) formed as a four-layered political-military
construction.
First of all, the Ottoman and Republican security cultures have been state-centric.
The Ottomans, from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, implemented
a reform policy in the public bureaucracy and military institution. The primary
purpose of the modernizing reforms was to strengthen the state in the face of the
threats emanating from the great powers of Europe and the detractors of those
reforms in the Empire. The survival of the state depended on its ability to adapt to
changing circumstances.37 The armed forces were the first institution that underwent
radical reforms. The Palace assigned the modernized military the task of protecting
the reforms against “the internal enemies,” which were presumably the traditionalists
and extremist religious groups. The modernized military, however, exercised from
time to time this role of guardianship against the Throne as well. This practice was
gradually internalized by the military and other state elites and was inherited by
the Republic. The crux of the dominant discourse has always been “the preservation
of the state.”
Another dimension of the Ottoman-Turkish political culture has been “the inter-
active or dialogical dimension” of “clashes between alternative frameworks of
meaning” in which “the two horizons fused together.”38 The ability and possibility
of this dialogical process have survived in the sinews of the state under the
Republic. Şerif Mardin has made us understand this phenomenon in the most
eloquent way:
The history of modern Turkey is not that of a conflict between republicanism
and Sultanism, nor is it a history of the strife framed by Islam and secularism.
It is a complex, many-tiered encounter between “traditional” forces and mod-
ernity that have interpenetrated and been transformed over time due to their
propinquity. It is also a story of the constitution of new spaces where these
forces have met and changed.39
This interpenetration has legitimized change and facilitated their adaptation to
modernity.40 The spaces of shared understanding were constituted by the state and
for the state, the common objective being the adjustment of the state to the changing
environment to ensure its preservation. Within this continual process of adaptation, in
spite of occasional ruptures, there have been long periods of collegial relationship
between civilians and officers in the Turkish Republic. In those periods civil-
military relations operated on a fairly effective democratic basis. The Turkish War
of Independence (1919–1922), Turkey’s alignment with NATO (1952) and the
Democrat Party period (1950–1960) which ended with a military coup, the Özal






























period (1983–1993), and the period of the EU reforms from 2002 to 2006 can be
mentioned as conspicuous examples.
The third layer was formed under the impact of the wave of democratization that
spread in the Western world after World War II. Turkey adopted the multiparty
system in 1945. The TAF were divided on the transition to democracy. A number
of officers were concerned about the risks of democracy because they believed that
it would be difficult to maintain the republican principles, particularly laicism, in a
democratic polity. Another group of officers were in favor of a multiparty system.
They believed that the democratic transformation would facilitate Turkey’s admis-
sion to NATO.41
As a result of the transition to democracy, the military found itself in a dilemma.
Democracy had emerged as an indispensable element of modernization. Democracy,
however, had brought about ideological fault lines and social, economic and political
interests to the center stage. Moreover, what seemed more ominous was that it tended
to make religion increasingly visible as a social force. The officers, confronted with
this challenge, adopted an ambivalent position towards democracy. On the one hand,
the military agreed to democratization, on the other hand, it maintained its guardian-
ship role. Although democracy (and modernity) implied civilian primacy, the military
refrained from acting as an agent of the civilian government because the officers
believed that subordination to civilian politicians would prejudice their role of guar-
dianship.42 The generals’ declarations interestingly reflect this dilemma.43 Even the
most democratically oriented generals in the 2000s, such as General Hilmi Özkök,
seemed to be unable to escape from the dilemma. General Özkök believed that
Article 35 of the Internal Service Law is necessary and it should not be abolished.
That article authorizes the TAF to intervene in politics ex officio to protect the
constitutional regime whenever it deems necessary. Nevertheless, he said that he
would prefer non-coercive, diplomatic ways of intervention.44
The fourth layer is being constructed by the opening of channels of communication
and monitoring between the TAF and other institutions, public and private, at the
national and international levels. There is a growing pressure for further democratiza-
tion from the certain segments of the population as well as from certain non-
governmental organizations and intelligentsia. Political statements of the Chiefs of
General Staff and force commanders spark heated critical debates in the media.
Many columnists and academics severely criticize such statements as unjustified
interventions in politics. Political Science and International Relations departments
at higher institutions of learning and think tanks take an increasing interest in security
studies and civil-military relations. The generals are also beginning to be interested in
such issues.45 Turkey’s voluntary participation in peace operations after the Cold War
should be expected to contribute to the transformation of the military mindset in line
with emerging security conceptualizations suggesting human and societal dimensions
of security.
Turkey’s candidacy for the EU membership has also opened new channels of com-
munication with democratic countries at both societal and state levels. Despite the
present unsatisfactory state of EU-Turkey relations, both parties continue to make






























use of the channels of communication to contribute to the democratization of civil-
military relations in Turkey.
Conclusion
During the last decade, academic research and publication on civil-military relations
have made considerable progress. The mainstream perspective, however, has
remained limited to binary and power-based analyses. This perspective is not
totally irrelevant because civil-military relations undoubtedly have a confrontational
power political aspect. However, since the mainstream approach in Turkish literature
has overlooked international structural changes and security culture, it proved to be
inadequate to explain the periods of close collaboration between the military and
the civilian government. This inadequacy was particularly palpable in the face of
the perplexing propinquity between the AKP government and the TAF.
The Ottoman-Turkish modernization depended on the creation by the state of
spaces of shared understanding in which dialogical encounters and interpenetrations
occurred between the forces of tradition and modernity. These encounters legitimized
change and facilitated the adaptation of state institutions to the changing environment
as well as modernity. In other words, this aspect of Turkey’s political culture refined
and moderated the guardianship role of the military although modernization alienated
the officers from the people to a considerable extent . . . The development of civil-
military relations in Turkey cannot be understood without giving due consideration
to the historical-cultural perspective. On the other hand, the relationship which is
understandable through the cultural approach should be open to explanations predi-
cated upon international structural variables that may initially induce the state to take
measures of adaptation.
As a result of the invasion of Iraq, the Middle Eastern sub-system became increas-
ingly more complex and more challenging. The difficult security environment
induced the government and the military to make efforts to develop a new strategic
outlook on the Kurdish question in general and the struggle against the PKK in par-
ticular with certain political (non-military) and international overtones. Moreover, the
cross-border military operations into northern Iraq required international legitimiza-
tion and this could only be achieved through diplomacy. These circumstances
increased the need for politics and civilian efforts, and brought the government to
the forefront in security policy-making.
Since Turkey is rapidly integrating to a globalizing world and it is a member of
NATO, OSCE, and a negotiating candidate to the EU membership, its civil-military
relations cannot remain solely on the domestic level. International involvements are
inevitable, enlarging the cultural context in which the dialogical inter-subjective
process takes place. From this perspective, keeping the channels of communication
with the EU open could help facilitate and expedite the reform process in Turkey
as witnessed in 2002–2006.
In consolidated democracies, the civilian control of the military is taken for granted
in spite of occasional derelictions of duty on the part of the military. It is internalized






























by both civilians and soldiers. In unconsolidated democracies such as Turkey, the
civilian control is yet to be internalized. It is to be constructed. The military must
come to believe that subordination to the civilian authority is a virtue.46 This kind
of a process of construction implies a cultural change which, in turn, needs open
channels of inter-subjective communication inside and outside.
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texts, see the website of the Turkish General Staff: http://www.tsk.tr/KOMUTANKONUSMALAR.
html
33. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 52.
34. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Struc-
ture Second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); David Pion-Berlin, ed., Civil-
Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 2001); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
35. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 131.
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Yayınları, 2010), pp. 3–18.
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Heinz Kramer, eds., Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities (London:
Tauris, 1993), pp. 19–34.
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44. See the interview with General Hilmi Özkök, Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi [The General’s Front]
(Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010), pp. 182–4.
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